

CLASSIFICATION

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

REPORT

50X1-HUM

INFORMATION FROM

FOREIGN DOCUMENTS OR RADIO BROADCASTS

CD NO.

COUNTRY German Democratic Republic

DATE OF
INFORMATION 1950

SUBJECT Political

HOW
PUBLISHED Daily newspapers

DATE DIST. 31 Jan 1951

WHERE
PUBLISHED Stockholm

NO. OF PAGES 2

DATE
PUBLISHED 14, 29 Dec 1950SUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO.

LANGUAGE Swedish

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE
OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF ESPIONAGE ACT 50
U. S. C. 31 AND 32, AS AMENDED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION
OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PRO-
HIBITED BY LAW. REPRODUCTION OF THIS FORM IS PROHIBITED.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE Newspapers as indicated.

REPORTS NEW SOVIET POLICY ON GERMAN PROBLEM

WOULD SEEK TO NEUTRALIZE UNITED GERMANY -- Stockholm, Svenska Dagbladet,
14 Dec 50

Bonn, 13 December -- The Frankfurter Rundschau's Stockholm correspon-
dent claims to have learned from an extremely reliable diplomatic source
that Grotewohl's letter to Adenauer and his offer to have him speak over
the East German radio is supposed to be the introduction of a new Soviet
policy in the German problem.

What it would be is nothing more or less than a return to the Rapallo
line. The USSR would resign itself to German rearmament and the unification
of Germany under non-Communist control, but would seek to neutralize this
united Germany in the same manner as Chicherin at one time sought to neutral-
ize Weimar Germany under Stresemann. The Soviet argument is said to be the
fear of all Germans that their country may again become a battleground.

It is naturally impossible to determine how much fact there is behind
this story, which has aroused great interest. Off and on it has been said
that the Soviets were prepared for such a complete about-face. Situations
can be imagined where this might actually be the case, but until there is
more concrete evidence, it might be well to consider this correspondent's
statement wishful thinking.

ULBRICHT OPPOSES NEW LINE, CALLED TO KREMLIN -- Stockholm Dagens Nyheter,
29 Dec 50

Berlin, 28 December -- The East German Communist leader, Walter Ulbricht,
has been in Moscow since 12 December to negotiate with the Kremlin. His trip
must naturally be considered to be in connection with the possible four-power
conference and the shift in Soviet policy with regard to Germany, signaled both
by the invitation to the conference and by Grotewohl's letter to Adenauer. It
is said that Ulbricht entertains grave doubts as to the new line, and that he
was called to Moscow to be instructed in the new tactics.

- 1 -

CLASSIFICATION

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

STATE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	NAVY	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	NSRB															
ARMY	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	AIR	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	FBI															

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

50X1-HUM

The object of the Soviet policy is, of course, to prevent the rearmament of Western Germany and particularly to prevent the Ruhr from becoming an arsenal for the West. Both the invitation to the four-power conference and the letter to Adenauer were sent with this in mind. A well informed source in Berlin reports that Ulbricht is apprehensive that the new approach indicates that the Soviets, in their attempt to neutralize Germany, are prepared to make concessions to East Germany [i.e., grant greater autonomy] which will result in jeopardizing the position of the SED [which owes its present position of leadership to the direct Soviet support within the Zone.]

According to this interpretation, Ulbricht opposed Grotewohl's letter, prepared on Soviet order. He is said to have gone to Moscow to seek to save his position by trading his approval of and cooperation in the new line for Soviet concessions. This latter point fits in quite well with the East German propaganda about the Grotewohl letter.

- E N D -

- 2 -

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL